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 A US citizen is an executive at Ford Motor Company in 
Argentina.1 While out sailing with his Argentine wife, and their four 
children, they are abducted by pirates.2 When the husband is unable to 
provide enough money for ransom, the pirates torture the family, 
killing the wife and children.3 As it so happens, the pirates were 
secretly funded by a Mercedes Benz executive, an Argentine national, 
in Argentina.4 Can the husband, the sole survivor, bring a claim under 
the Torture Victim Protection Act (the “TVPA”) on his own behalf, 
and a claim under the Alien Tort Statute (the “ATS”) on behalf of his 
family against Mercedes (the German parent corporation) in a United 
States court?5 
 The US Supreme Court’s January 2014 decision in Daimler 
AG v. Bauman suggests that the answer is no, for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.6 In the United States, personal jurisdiction, or the power 
to subject an individual to the judgment of the court, must comply 
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution.7 Personal jurisdiction is one half of what is known as 
adjudicative jurisdiction—the government’s power to “subject a 
person or thing to the process of its courts or administrative 

1. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) 
(where plaintiffs were US citizens). 
2. See id. (plaintiffs’ children were on a soccer trip to France). 
3. See id. (children were killed in a bus accident outside of Paris resulting from a blown 
tire). 
4. See id. (tire that caused the accident was manufactured by Goodyear). 
5. See id. (parents of the children brought wrongful death claims against Goodyear in 
North Carolina state court); Torture Victims Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991) (allows 
filing of civil claims against individuals, who acting in an official capacity for any foreign 
nation, committed torture or extrajudicial killing); Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948) 
(permits filing of civil claims against an alien for torts only).    
6. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 (2014) (holding general jurisdiction 
typically only proper when defendant is domiciled in the forum); see also Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (asserting that the ATS does not apply 
extraterritorially). 
7. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733-35 (1877) (establishing the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause as the limit on in personam jurisdiction); see also 
International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (delineating the “minimum 
contacts” test for personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment).  
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tribunals.”8 Adjudicatory jurisdiction, as a concept of international 
law, also encompasses subject matter jurisdiction—namely, the power 
of a court to entertain the subject matter of the claim—and is only 
proper when both are present.9  
 In Daimler, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of general 
personal jurisdiction, one of two forms of personal jurisdiction 
recognized by US courts.10 Looking to the EU’s jurisdictional rules 
for guidance, the Court clarified its standard for general jurisdiction, 
holding it is only proper when the defendant is domiciled in the forum 
state.11 Yet, in trying to harmonize US personal jurisdiction doctrine 
with international law, the Court went too far and placed US 
plaintiffs, like the husband from the example above, at a 
disadvantage.12   
Before Daimler, such plaintiffs could bring their claims under 
theories of general jurisdiction.13 The plaintiffs argued that the 

8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401(h) (1987) 
(explaining jurisdiction to adjudicate). See generally Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. 
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1123-25 
(1966) (discussing adjudicative jurisdiction generally) [hereinafter von Mehren, Jurisdiction to 
Adjudicate].   
9. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 617, 617-18 (2006) (asserting that adjudicatory jurisdiction requires both subject 
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW § 401(h) (1987) (same).   
10. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760-63 (describing the Court’s jurisprudence in the area); see 
also Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122-23 (2014) (outlining specific personal 
jurisdiction, the other form of personal jurisdiction).  
11. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760-61 (citing European Parliament and Council Reg. 
1215/2012, Arts. 4(1), 63(1), 2012 O.J. (L. 351) 7, 18) (emphasizing general jurisdiction is 
only proper over corporation in forum of its “statutory seat,” “central administration,” or 
“principal place of business”); see Howard M. Erichson, The Home-State Test for General 
Personal Jurisdiction, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 81, 83 (2013) (discussing the Court’s 
unclear standard for general jurisdiction); see also Linda J. Silberman, Jurisdictional 
Imputation in DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman: A Bridge Too Far, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC 130, 130-31 (2013) (same); John N. Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World: 
The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1707, 1718-19 (2013) (describing how application of the “systematic and 
continuous” test leads to a lack of clarity) [hereinafter Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a 
Global World]. 
12. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2803 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (illustrating how US plaintiffs are disadvantaged); Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction 
in a Global World, supra note 11, at 1737 (same).  
13. See, e.g., Hess v. Bumbo Intern. Trust, 954 F. Supp. 2d 590, 593-94 (S.D. Tex. 2013) 
(finding general jurisdiction supported by systematic and continuous business activities); 
Patrick J. Borchers, Note, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 119, 121-
29 (2001) (describing general jurisdiction as “doing business jurisdiction” and how lower 
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defendant’s pervasive business activities in the forum justified general 
jurisdiction.14 No longer an option, these plaintiffs now have to bring 
their claims abroad, sacrificing all of the benefits of the US court 
system.15 Due to the increased cost of litigating abroad, however, such 
plaintiffs likely will drop their claims altogether, a particularly unfair 
result because the Mercedes of the world have liability insurance.16 
As Justice Sotomayor stated in Daimler, this reinforces the 
proposition that some corporations are simply “too big to fail.”17 
Looking to the international rules for personal jurisdiction, just 
as the Court did in Daimler, there are situations where defendants 
may be sued in a court even when they are not domiciled in the 
country.18 That is the case even outside of what is known in the 
United States as specific personal jurisdiction.19 For instance, many 
countries, particularly civil law countries, have provisions specifically 
designed to provide their citizens relief.20 In France, jurisdiction is 
proper when the plaintiff is a French national, regardless of where the 

courts apply it); Mary Twitchell, Article, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business 
Jurisdiction, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 172 (2001) (same); Linda J. Silberman, Comparative 
Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention be 
Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 340 (2002) (noting that many corporations, like Siemens, 
Phillips, Daimler-Chrysler and Novartis, have a large presence in the U.S. even without 
principal place of business or place of incorporation). 
14. See generally Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (rejecting 
this approach); see also Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing 
Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 675 (2012) (describing the approach in lower 
courts). But see Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World, supra note 11, at 1726 
(explaining that plaintiffs nonetheless tried this when specific jurisdiction not possible). 
15. See, e.g., Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (where US plaintiff was forced to litigate his 
claims abroad or forfeit them entirely); see also Peter F. Schlosser, Lectures on Civil-Law 
Litigation Systems an American Cooperation with Those Systems, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 9, 37 
(1996) (articulating that US plaintiffs are particularly disadvantaged because they lose out US 
courts, known as “plaintiffs’ heaven” because of contingency fee arrangements and jury trials).  
16. Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World, supra note 11, at 1732-33 (“People 
in business should buy liability insurance . . . ”); Louise Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and 
the Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 913 (1985) (same). 
17. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
18. See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 14 (Fr.) (jurisdiction proper when plaintiff is 
French national); ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 23 (Ger.) 
(jurisdiction proper when defendant has property in Germany). 
19. See, e.g., Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787-88 (describing specific jurisdiction).  
20. See Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, French Article 14 Jurisdiction, Viewed 
from the United States, (Cornell Law Faculty Publications), Paper 13 at 3 (2004) (“[N]ations 
tend to give their own people a way to sue at home, at least when the home country will be 
able to enforce the resulting judgment.”); see also Linda J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: 
Observations from a Transnational and Comparative Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 591, 607 
(2012) (discussing how France provides forums for its own citizens to obtain relief).  
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parties are domiciled.21 Germany takes a slightly different approach, 
allowing jurisdiction on the basis of property within the country 
(quasi in rem).22 
This Note will explore and compare personal jurisdiction in the 
United States and the European Union. Part I will explain personal 
jurisdiction doctrine in the United States as it evolved through the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the US Constitution. Part I will also 
survey the jurisdictional rules in the European Union, focusing 
specifically on Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Part II 
will compare the differences between US personal jurisdiction and 
rules of other nations. Finally, in arguing that US plaintiffs are at a 
disadvantage as compared to their EU counterparts, Part III will 
endorse a more expansive approach to US personal jurisdiction, 
incorporating internationally accepted bases of personal jurisdiction. 
I. WHAT IS PERSONAL JURISDICTION?  
Part I of this Note explores the framework for personal 
jurisdiction in the United States and the European Union. Part I.A will 
describe the US approach to personal jurisdiction, derived from the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
“minimum contacts” test, as delineated by the Supreme Court in 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.23 Part I.B will explore personal 
jurisdiction in the European Union, highlighting its statutory 
foundation. Since EU law only regulates litigation as between 
Member States, a foray into the specific jurisdictional rules of 
Member States is necessary in order to explain how courts treat non-
EU defendants. This Note will focus on the jurisdictional rules of 
Germany and France, civil law countries, as well as England, a 
common law country.  

21. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 14 (Fr.) (permitting jurisdiction based on nationality); 
see also C. CIV. art. 14 (Luxembourg) (jurisdiction is proper when the plaintiff is a citizen of 
Luxembourg); [BW] CIVIL CODE, art. 3 (Neth.) (providing general jurisdiction when applicant 
is Dutch). 
22. See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 23 (Ger.); but 
see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1976) (concluding property in the forum does not 
displace minimum contacts requirement). 
23. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[Nor] shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without the due process of law . . .”); International Shoe v. State of 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding personal jurisdiction is proper only when a 
defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state). 
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A. Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in the United States 
This Section of the Note begins with a description of the 
International Shoe test for personal jurisdiction. It will then discuss 
its application in cases of specific jurisdiction and general 
jurisdiction. Finally, this Section explains the role reasonableness has 
come to play in US personal jurisdiction doctrine.  
1. The International Shoe Test  
The modern test for personal jurisdiction in the United States is 
the “minimum contacts” test, whereby a defendant must have “certain 
minimum contacts” with the forum such that asserting jurisdiction 
does not offend due process.24 In International Shoe, the Supreme 
Court held that a nonresident corporation met the minimum contacts 
standard through its business contacts with Washington; thus personal 
jurisdiction over the corporation was proper.25 The Court has held that 
the minimum contacts test is satisfied when defendants “purposefully 
avail” themselves of the forum state.26 The Court reasoned that such 
defendants—those who seek out the privileges of a forum state’s laws 
by doing business there—should “reasonably anticipate” being forced 
to litigate there as well.27 
2. Specific vs. General Jurisdiction  
In International Shoe, the Court contemplated two forms of 
personal jurisdiction, specific and general jurisdiction, based on the 
nature of contacts a defendant had with the forum.28 Specific 
jurisdiction exists when the cause of action arises from the 

24. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S .457, 463 (1940)) 
(holding jurisdiction must comport with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”). 
25. Id. at 320 (noting that the business contacts were systematic and continuous). 
26. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“[I]t is essential in each case that 
there by some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and privileges of its 
laws.”). But see Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World, supra note 11, at 1730 
(noting that the purposeful availment requirement does not replace the minimum contacts test 
for personal jurisdiction). 
27.  Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (finding the nature their 
contractual relationship with Burger King meant defendants should have expected that 
litigation would take place there). 
28. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (describing what are now known as specific and general 
personal jurisdiction). 
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defendant’s conduct within the forum, whereas general jurisdiction is 
present when the defendant’s activities are so pervasive in the forum 
state that jurisdiction is distinct from any specific activities which 
give rise to the suit.29 
In 2011, recognizing a lack of clarity in its personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court attempted to define both specific 
and general personal jurisdiction.30 In J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, a specific jurisdiction case, Robert Nicastro, a scrapyard 
employee in New Jersey, injured his hand with a metal shearing 
machine manufactured by J. McIntyre, a UK company.31 Nicastro’s 
employer purchased the machine from an independent distributor that 
sold McIntyre’s products in the United States.32  
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the stream of 
commerce theory elucidated by the Supreme Court in World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, and embraced by the New Jersey 
court below.33 Instead, the Court focused on purposeful availment, or 
rather, the lack thereof.34 While a defendant’s knowledge that its 
products may be purchased within the forum state occasionally 
indicates purposeful availment, the Court explained, it does not 
displace the main inquiry: “whether the defendant’s activities 
manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.”35 

29. Id.; see also J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2010) 
(distinguishing general jurisdiction from specific personal jurisdiction); see, e.g., Drobak, 
Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World, supra note 11, at 1725 (“When the cause of action 
does not ‘arise out of or relate to’ the forum activities, the connections between the defendant 
and the forum have to be at their highest—hence the ‘at home’ requirement of Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires. Likewise, when the cause of action is somehow related to the forum, the 
defendant’s connection to the forum can be something less than having its ‘home’ there.”). 
30. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (delineating specific personal jurisdiction); 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853-54 (2011) (delineating general 
personal jurisdiction).  
31. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (noting it was just one of four J. McIntyre machines in 
New Jersey).   
32.  Id. (describing the company’s distribution chain).  
33. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980) (“The 
forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal 
jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the 
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”).  
34. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (pointing out intentional conduct on the part of the 
defendant was necessary); see World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98 (same).  
35. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788; see also Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014) 
(emphasizing that the strength of defendant’s intentional affiliation with the forum state is to 
be the central inquiry in specific jurisdiction cases).  
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Without showing McIntyre specifically targeted the New Jersey 
market, personal jurisdiction was not proper.36  
The same day it handed down its decision in Nicastro, the Court 
decided Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown, where it attempted to 
clarify the standard for general personal jurisdiction.37 In Goodyear, 
two thirteen-year-old US citizens were killed in a bus accident that 
occurred outside of Paris, France, the result of a blown-out tire.38 The 
parents of the children, also US citizens, filed a wrongful death suit in 
North Carolina state court against Goodyear USA, Goodyear Turkey, 
Goodyear France, and Goodyear Luxembourg.39  
Aside from Goodyear USA, which never contested personal 
jurisdiction, the remaining defendants did not conduct any business in 
North Carolina.40 The Supreme Court determined Goodyear’s tire 
sales made in North Carolina through intermediaries were too 
“sporadic” to justify general jurisdiction.41 According to Justice 
Ginsburg, announcing the new test for general jurisdiction, Goodyear 
was “in no sense at home” in the forum state.42 
3. Reasonableness  
While the minimum contacts approach focuses on the strength of 
the defendant’s affiliation to the forum, a court may look to other 
factors to determine whether assertion of personal jurisdiction would 
be reasonable.43 As outlined by the Supreme Court in World-Wide 
Volkswagen, these factors include: 1) the burden on the defendant, 2) 
the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, 3) the plaintiff's 
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, 4) the interstate 

36. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct.  at 2788 (explaining that a prediction of where its goods may end 
up was not enough). 
37. Id. (holding a corporation must be “at home” in the forum state for general 
jurisdiction to be proper). 
38. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 U.S. 2846, 2857 (2011) 
(mentioning the boys were in France for a soccer trip).  
39. Id. at 2857 (noting the parents brought claims against tires manufacturer). 
40. Id. at 2852 (noting the tires designed by the European defendants were specifically 
designed for European market).   
41. Id. at 2857. 
42. Id. at 2857 (further explaining that the flow of a defendant’s goods “may bolster an 
affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction,” but not general jurisdiction); see also Erichson, 
supra note 11, at 81-83 (arguing for the “home state” standard); Silberman, Jurisdictional 
Imputation, supra note 11, at 130-31 (same). 
43. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292-95 (describing the factors); see also 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 115-16 (1987) 
(analyzing these factors in the international context). 
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judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies, and 5) the shared interest of the several States in 
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.44 While the World-
Wide Volkswagen factors have been used in a variety of cases, they 
are particularly important when alien defendants are brought to court 
in the United States.45   
In Asahi Metal Industrial Corp. v. Superior Court of California, 
a specific jurisdiction case, the Court analyzed the World-Wide 
Volkswagen reasonableness factors in the international context.46 
After a motorcycle accident in California, the plaintiff sued the 
Taiwanese manufacturer of the motorcycle’s tire tube, Cheng Shin 
Rubber Industrial Company.47 The company then filed a cross-
complaint for indemnification against Asahi Metal, which 
manufactured the tube’s valve assembly.48   
 In its plurality opinion, the Court explained that even if 
personal jurisdiction of Asahi was proper under the stream of 
commerce theory, it was nonetheless unreasonable.49 The Court cited 
several of the World-Wide Volkswagen factors, including the serious 
burden on Asahi if forced to litigate in California and California’s 
limited interests in adjudicating the claim, especially considering the 
only claim left was one for indemnification.50 Finally, regarding the 

44. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292-95 (suggesting California’s interest in 
adjudicating the claim would have been greater if the original claim of products liability 
remained). 
45. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115-16 (analyzing reasonableness of jurisdiction over a 
foreign corporation using the factors set out in World-Wide Volkswagen); United States v. First 
Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Great care and reserve 
should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international 
field . . ."); see also Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 
17 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 30 (1987) (“When state courts assert jurisdiction over foreign 
nationals residing abroad, the possibility of state interference with the nation's foreign affairs 
arises; when state courts make, or are perceived abroad to make, exorbitant jurisdictional 
assertions, the possibility of interference becomes a very real risk.”).  
46. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105-06 (claim involved Japanese and Taiwanese parties). 
47. Id. at 106 (headquartered in Taiwan). 
48. Id. (headquartered in Japan). 
49. Id. at 114 (assessing the World-Wide Volkswagen factors); see generally Silberman, 
supra note 11, at 128 (“An injury in the forum state allegedly caused by the foreign 
manufacturer justifies jurisdiction there for several reasons: the state has a strong regulatory 
interest in accidents that occur within its jurisdiction, litigation convenience is best served in 
an action at the place of injury, and a foreign defendant in these circumstances can expect to 
defend a suit in forum where it has been in a chain of activity that causes an injury there.”). 
50. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114-15 (analyzing each factor with respect to the facts of the case 
and determining it was still unclear whether California law would even govern the claim). But 
see Silberman, supra note 11, at 132 (suggesting burden on an alien defendant may be better 
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scope of a court’s adjudicatory power in the international context, the 
plurality cautioned that broad assertions of personal jurisdiction 
implicate “the interests of other nations.”51 The Court concluded that 
a reasonableness analysis appropriately balances such interests, as 
well as any interests the US government may have, managing foreign 
relations being just one them.52 
4. Daimler AG v. Bauman  
In 2013, two years after Goodyear was decided, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in Daimler AG v. Bauman to clarify the 
elusive “at home” standard.53 The plaintiffs, twenty-two Argentine 
citizens, brought claims against the German corporation Daimler for 
human rights abuses that took place during Argentina’s “Dirty War” 
in the 1970s.54 The claims were filed over thirty years later in the 
Northern District of California under the ATS.55 The claims were 
swiftly dismissed by the district court for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.56  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the assertion of 
general personal jurisdiction proper because Daimler’s subsidiary, 
Delaware corporation Mercedes-Benz USA, had sufficient contacts 
with California.57 As predicted by many, the Supreme Court reversed 
the Ninth Circuit, deciding Daimler was not amenable to suit in 

addressed through a “nuanced doctrine of forum non conveniens that leaves discretion to the 
trial court”); Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction Over 
Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 56 (2006) (same). 
51. Asahi, 800 U.S. at 114-15. 
52. Id. at 115; see also Born, supra note 45, at 35 (“Before asserting jurisdiction over 
foreign persons, US courts should give careful scrutiny to the defendant's relationship to the 
forum, paying especial attention to jurisdictional claims likely to offend foreign sovereigns.”).  
53. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (mentioning that the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision embraced an even broader view of general jurisdiction than rejected by the 
Court in Goodyear); see, e.g., Hess v. Bumbo Intern. Trust, 954 F. Supp. 2d 590, 593-94 
(finding general jurisdiction over out of state defendant proper even though not at home there). 
See generally Borchers, supra note 13 (characterizing general jurisdiction as “doing business 
jurisdiction”). 
54. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751 (describing the history of the violence). 
55. Id. (noting claims were also brought under the Torture Victims Protection Act, as 
well as California and international law claims).  
56. Id. at 752 (finding Daimler’s contacts with California did not support assertion of 
general jurisdiction). 
57. Id. (applying a modified agency test which allowed the subsidiary’s contacts to be 
imputed to the principal).  
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California.58 Even considering Daimler’s US subsidiary’s contacts, 
Daimler was not at home in California.59  
The Court also eliminated any ambiguity left by the Goodyear 
holding: general jurisdiction is only proper where contacts are 
systematic and continuous such that the corporation is at home in the 
forum, i.e., domiciled.60 The Court asserted that systematic and 
continuous business activities alone were not sufficient for general 
jurisdiction.61 Justice Ginsburg concluded, “[a] corporation that 
operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of 
them.”62  
Justice Ginsburg did not stop there, however.63 In response to 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion, which argued for dismissal 
of the claims on reasonableness grounds alone, Justice Ginsburg 
specifically rejected Asahi as applicable in general jurisdiction cases, 
albeit in a footnote.64 She explained that it was only appropriate in 
specific jurisdiction cases where contacts with the forum were 
typically more attenuated.65 As for general jurisdiction cases, Justice 
Ginsburg asserted, “When a corporation is genuinely ‘at home’ in the 
forum state, however, any second-step inquiry would be 
superfluous.”66  

58. Id. (holding Daimler was not at home in California); see also Erichson, supra note 
11, at 82 (arguing the case was an “easy jurisdictional question on its facts”); Silberman, supra 
note 11, at 129-30  (same).   
59. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. 
60. Id. at 761-63 (reasoning that place of incorporation and principal place of business 
are “paradigmatic” bases for domicile); Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World, 
supra note 11, at 1719 (noting that requiring “systematic and continuous” contacts alone leads 
to “too much uncertainty”). 
61. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761. 
62. Id. at 762 n.20; see also von Mehren, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate, supra note 8, at 
1141-42 (“General adjudicatory jurisdiction over corporations and other legal persons could be 
exercised by the community with which the legal person had its closest and most continuing 
legal and factual connections. The community that chartered the corporation and in which it 
has its head office occupies a position somewhat analogous to that of the community of a 
natural person’s domicile and habitual residence. If a corporation’s managerial and 
administrative center is in a state other than its state of incorporation, presumably general 
jurisdiction should exist in either community.”). 
63. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20 (addressing reasonableness).  
64. Id. (explaining why reasonableness was not appropriate in general jurisdiction cases); 
id. at 764-65 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (cautioning that it would be “imprudent” for the 
Court to decide such an issue, especially when neither party briefed the issue).  
65. Id. at 762 n.20 (noting that the fewer the contacts the heavier the burden on the 
defendant being forced to litigate in the United States). 
66. Id.  
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 Through application of the minimum contacts approach, 
courts have distinguished between two categories of cases—those of 
general personal jurisdiction and those of specific personal 
jurisdiction.67 If a defendant is domiciled in the forum state, personal 
jurisdiction is proper for any type of claim.68 US courts have specific 
jurisdiction over a defendant when the dispute arises from the 
defendant’s in-state contacts.69 In such cases, courts may look to 
whether defendants purposefully avail themselves of “privileges and 
benefits” of the forum state’s laws.70 Finally, a court hearing a 
specific jurisdiction case may look to whether the assertion of 
jurisdiction is nonetheless unreasonable.71  
B. Personal Jurisdiction in the European Union 
This Section will begin with an outline of the development of 
jurisdictional rules in the European Union. When non-EU defendants 
are involved in the litigation, however, Member States are free to 
craft their own jurisdictional rules. So, the second part of this Section 
will be further divided into three subsections to examine the 
jurisdictional rules of Germany, France, and England.  
1. The Brussels Convention 
Unlike the US approach to personal jurisdiction, which evolved 
through the US Supreme Court’s interpretation of the US 
Constitution, the European Union takes a statutory approach.72 The 
Brussels I Regulation (the “EU Regulation”) now governs all Member 
States, excluding Denmark, for all commercial and civil matters.73 
The EU Regulation not only defines the scope of jurisdiction for 

67. See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319-20 (delineating two categories of personal 
jurisdiction). 
68. See, e.g., Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 (holding general jurisdiction only proper when 
defendant is domiciled in the forum). 
69. See, e.g., Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (finding in-state contacts not sufficient for 
assertion of specific jurisdiction).  
70. See id.  
71. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-95 (describing 
each of the reasonableness factors). 
72. See, e.g., Council Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 012) art. 60 [hereinafter EU 
Regulation] (laying out the bases for personal jurisdiction in the European Union).  
73. EU Regulation, supra note 72, art. 1(3) (establishing jurisdictional standards for the 
European Union); but see 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 (EU) (taking effect in 2015).  
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Member States but it also establishes the enforcement of those 
judgments.74  
Article Two of the EU Regulation provides that EU defendants 
may be sued, “whatever their nationality,” wherever they are 
domiciled.75 For persons, domicile constitutes their residence; for 
corporations, domicile is defined as its statutory seat, central 
administration, or principal place of business.76 A plaintiff of one 
Member State may only sue a defendant of another Member State 
pursuant to the EU Regulation, without consideration of the forum’s 
own personal jurisdiction laws.77  
Section Six of the EU Regulation describes when a Member 
State’s court has “exclusive jurisdiction,” regardless of where a party 
is domiciled.78 When the claim involves immovable property, courts 
of that state have exclusive jurisdiction.79 If the claim involves 
patents, trademarks, or designs, exclusive jurisdiction lies wherever 
registration took place.80 
The EU Regulation also provides “special jurisdiction” for 
specific types of claims.81 For example, special jurisdiction for 
contract claims is proper in the state where the performance is due.82 
For tort claims, special jurisdiction allows claims to be brought where 
the harm occurred.83 For disputes arising out of a specific business 
establishment, claims may be brought in the state of that 
establishment.84 When a suit has multiple defendants, special 

74. EU Regulation, supra note 72, at art. 1(1) (explaining the purpose of the EU 
regulation). 
75. Id. at art. 2(1). 
76. Id. at art. 60(1) (permitting jurisdiction when defendant is domiciled in the forum 
state). 
77. Id. at art. 3(1) (requiring that the EU Regulation govern any intra-EU disputes).  
78. Id. at art. 22.  
79. Id. at art. 22(1) (delineating exclusive jurisdiction and when it is proper). 
80. Id. at art. 22(4) (describing the basis for exclusive jurisdiction).  
81. Id.  
82. Id. at art. 5(1)(a) (regulating jurisdiction for contract claims). 
83. Id. at art. 5(3) (providing jurisdiction over tort claims); see also Case 21/76, 
Reinwater Foundation v. Mines de Potasse d' Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735, 1 C.M.L.R. 284 
(1977) (holding that jurisdiction was proper either where the tort occurred or where its effects 
were felt).  
84. EU Regulation, supra note 72, at art. 5(5) (describing proper jurisdiction for specific 
transactions); see also EU Regulation, supra note 72, at art. 15(2) (setting forth when 
jurisdiction over consumer contracts is proper).  
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jurisdiction allows the claim to be brought in any state a defendant is 
domiciled.85  
As demonstrated above, jurisdiction is straightforward when the 
claims involve only EU parties.86 Pursuant to Article 4 of the EU 
Regulation, however, “[i]f the defendant is not domiciled in a 
Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State 
shall, subject to Articles 22 and 23, be determined by the law of that 
Member State.”87 Thus, if a claim involves a US defendant, the 
Regulation’s rules for jurisdiction do not apply, and the Member State 
who seeks jurisdiction over the defendant must apply its national 
laws.88  
2. Personal Jurisdiction in Germany  
As a civil law country, statutory law also governs personal 
jurisdiction in Germany.89 Under the German Code of Civil 
Procedure, the Zivilprozessordnung (the “ZPO”), there are two bases 
for jurisdiction: general and specific.90 If general jurisdiction is proper 
over a defendant, any type of claim may be brought against them in 
that court.91 When defendants are domiciled in Germany, general 
jurisdiction is proper.92 For corporations and similar legal entities 
(i.e., partnerships), general jurisdiction exists when their statutory seat 
is in Germany.93 

85. Id. at art. 6(1) (requiring the claims to be closely connected).  
86. See, e.g., id. (codifying each of the jurisdictional rules).  
87. Id. at art. 4(1).  
88. Id.  
89. See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] (Ger.) (codifying 
the German jurisdictional rules); Christopher B. Kuner, Personal Jurisdiction Based On The 
Presence Of Property In German Law: Past, Present, And Future, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 691, 
696 (1992) (citing Christof von Dryander, Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters 
Under the German Code of Civil Procedure, 16 INT’L L. 671, 673 (1982)) (describing civil 
law implications on personal jurisdiction); see also Michael Molitoris & Amelie Abt Noerr 
Stiefenhofer Lutz, Comparative Study of “Residual Jurisdiction” in Civil and Commercial 
Disputes in the EU National Reporter for: Germany, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_resid_jurisd_germany_en.pdf (providing 
extensive background information on how personal jurisdiction operates in Germany). 
90. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], §§ 12-19, 20-34 
(Ger.) (delineating bases of general jurisdiction). 
91. See id.; Christof von Dryander, supra note 89, at 675 n.24 (1982) (identifying rules 
for general jurisdiction under the ZPO). 
92. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], § 12 (Ger.) (subject to 
exceptions §§ 15-16). 
93. Id. at § 17 (defining domicile for corporations).  
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The broadest basis for general jurisdiction in Germany is Section 
Twenty-Three of the ZPO, which grants general jurisdiction over any 
defendant alien or domestic, natural person, or legal entity owning 
property in Germany.94 The burden is on the plaintiff to make out 
each element of Section Twenty-Three, including the specific location 
of the property.95 Since the property may be tangible or intangible,96 
debts and legal claims are included.97 For proper Section Twenty-
Three jurisdiction, the property does not need to be connected to the 
claim in question.98 As explained by Gary Born, a noted scholar in the 
area, “a Russian may leave his galoshes in a hotel in Berlin and may 
be sued in Berlin for a debt of 100,000 Marks because of presence of 
assets within the jurisdiction.”99  
While Section Twenty-Three may not be used against other EU 
defendants, it may be asserted against foreign defendants such as US 
citizens.100 Acknowledging the breadth of Section Twenty-Three, 
Germany’s highest court, the Bundesgerichtshof (the “BGH”), has 
imposed one limitation: the suit must have a “sufficient national 
connection.”101 In that case, the British plaintiff sued a Turkish bank 

94.  ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 23 (Ger.) 
(permitting quasi in rem jurisdiction); see von Dryander, supra note 89, at 678 (illustrating the 
broad effects of Section Twenty-Three). 
95. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 23 (Ger.); see also 
Kuner, supra note 89, at 697 n.39 (citing Judgment of July 13, 1987, BGH, 9 IPRax 166 
(1989)). 
96. See von Dryander, supra note 89, at 680 (citing Judgment of April 7, 1902, 
Reichsgericht, 51 RGZ 163) (holding account book provides sufficient basis for assertion of 
Section Twenty-Three jurisdiction). 
97. Kuner, supra note 89, at 698 n.47 (citing Jan Kropholler, Internationale 
Zuständigkeit, in 1 HANDBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHTS 183, 323 
(1982)) (illustrating examples of intangible assets). 
98. Kuner, supra note 89, at 698 n.50 (citing Reinhold Geimer, INTERNATIONALES 
ZIVILPROZEǺRECHT 259 (1987)) (outlining courts application of Section Twenty-Three 
jurisdiction) (citing Reinhold Geimer, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZEǺRECHT 259 (1987)). 
99. Born, supra note 45, at 14-15 (citing Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora, 
XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 321, 329 (1961)) 
(emphasizing the potentially broad reach of Section Twenty-Three jurisdiction) (citing 
Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora, XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND 
CONFLICTS LAW 321, 329 (1961)). 
100. See Silberman, supra note 13, at 322 (demonstrating Section Twenty-Three’s 
impact on non-EU defendants); von Dryander, supra note 89, at 682 (EU Regulation limits 
scope of Section Twenty-Three). 
101. Yearbook of Private International law Vol XII 2010 p. 279 n. 88 (citing BGH 
2.7.1991) (describing the court imposed limits on section Twenty-Three) (citing BGH 
2.7.1991); see, e.g., Mark/Ziegenhain, NJW 1992, 3062, 3065 (noting that courts may consider 
presence of registered offices, location of evidence, and business contacts). 
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for a claim relating to a construction project in Libya.102 The plaintiff 
alleged jurisdiction was proper since the defendant owned property in 
Germany worth DEM 150,000.103 The defendant argued its property 
was worth at most one tenth of that amount, and that the claim should 
nonetheless be dismissed because there was no connection to 
Germany.104  
While jurisdiction was initially found proper, the German 
appeals court, the Oberlandesgericht, reversed, finding the plaintiff, 
the applicable law, and the evidence lacked any relation to 
Germany.105 The court posited four situations where the relation 
requirement would be met: 1) plaintiff resides in Germany, 2) facts of 
the claim are most closely connected to Germany, 3) German law will 
apply, or 4) plaintiff has a “worthy” interest in German judgment.106 
The BGH affirmed the judgment, holding Section Twenty-Three 
jurisdiction is proper only when there is a “sufficient connection” to 
Germany, aside from defendant’s property.107 The Court determined 
such a limit was necessary to effectuate the rule’s original purpose: 
providing German creditors with a means to sue defendants who 
moved frequently so as not to establish domicile.108 Section Twenty-
Three’s current formulation, the Court reasoned, allowed forum-
shopping, which could create friction with other nations.109  
Examining the ZPO’s rules for specific jurisdiction, it must first 
be noted that only property-based claims may be brought.110 Specific 
jurisdiction exists when the cause of action arises out of a 

102. Judgment of Aug. 6, 1990, OLG Stuttgart, 1990 RIW 829 (holding jurisdiction was 
improper). 
103. Id. (holding the property was not sufficient for jurisdiction); The Currency 
Converter, CoinMill.com http://coinmill.com/DEM_EUR.html#DEM=150000 (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2014) (converts to roughly EU€76,700).  
104. Judgment of Aug. 6, 1990, OLG Stuttgart, supra note 102, at 829 (dismissing the 
claim). 
105. Id. (determining jurisdiction was not proper since the claim was wholly unrelated to 
Germany). 
106. Id. (suggesting situations where a claim would have the necessary connection to 
Germany). 
107. Judgment of July 2, 1991, BGH, 1991 NJW 3092. 
108. Id. (affirming judgment of appeals court). 
109. Id. (addressing concerns by statute’s over usage). 
110. See id.; Henry P. de Vries & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction in Personal 
Actions—A Comparison of Civil Law Views, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 306, 331 (1959) (explaining how 
these claims usually arise from specific transactions).  
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residence,111 a branch location,112 location of property,113 location of 
contractual performance,114 or the place where a tort was 
committed.115 Branch location, as a basis for special jurisdiction, 
expands the scope of jurisdiction over non-EU corporations because 
formal “domicile” is not required.116 Specific jurisdiction is proper, 
however, only when the cause of action arises from the business of 
that particular branch.117 As defined by the ZPO,  
[A] place of business serving the operation of a factory, a trade 
enterprise, or any other commercial establishment, and from 
which transactions are directly concluded, all actions that relate 
to the operation of the place of business may be brought against 
that person at the court of the location at which the place of 
business is situate [sic].118 
The BGH has addressed this form of jurisdiction as well, 
shedding light on its scope.119 In that case, a German shipping 
company brought a claim against a Dutch cooperative at its German 
branch.120 The defendant’s business was to obtain rebates from the 
German Federal Railway and give them to the cooperative’s 
members.121 The German company claimed rebates that were past 
due.122 The court of appeals dismissed the claim, noting that although 
the claims arose from the Dutch company’s branch in Germany, the 
German branch did not independently and directly enter into the 
agreements for rebates with its members.123 The BGH reversed the 

111. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 20 (Ger.) 
(explaining that presence alone not sufficient for proper jurisdiction). 
112. Id. at § 21 (pointing out that branch location is a basis for special jurisdiction).  
113. Id. at § 23 (permitting jurisdiction in Germany when defendant owns property 
there). 
114. Id. at § 29 (contract jurisdiction); see, e.g., von Dryander, supra note 89, at 685 
(discussing how jurisdiction is determined in contract disputes). 
115. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 32 (Ger.) (defining 
tort jurisdiction); von Dryander, supra note 89, at 690 (including forum where effects from tort 
are felt). 
116. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 21 (Ger.); von 
Dryander, supra note 89, at 677 (explaining the effects of this basis for jurisdiction). 
117. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 21 (Ger.) 
(outlining jurisdiction pertaining to a specific branch location).  
118. Id.  
119. Judgment of July 10, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof, 1977 NJW 2142 (holding 
jurisdiction is proper where the branch independently and directly enters into contracts).   
120. Id. (describing the origins of the claim which involved breach of contract). 
121. Id. (identifying scope of defendant’s business operations). 
122. Id. (explaining the background of the claim). 
123. Id. (conceding the branch did help calculate rebates for its members). 
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court of appeals, holding that so long as a branch independently and 
directly entered into any contracts, jurisdiction was proper.124 
3. Personal Jurisdiction in France  
In France, the rules for personal jurisdiction are codified in the 
Civil Code as well as the New Code of Civil Procedure, which was 
adopted in 1975.125 The statutory rules permit general, “all-purpose” 
jurisdiction over defendants who are domiciled in France.126 French 
law defines “domicile” as the place where the defendant has its 
principal establishment.127 General jurisdiction is also proper if the 
defendant appears to be domiciled in France and leads the plaintiff to 
believe it was his real domicile.128 
As for specific jurisdiction, Article Forty-Six of the New Code 
defines the proper bases for jurisdiction depending on the type of 
claim.129 For contract claims, the plaintiff may bring suit in a court 
where the defendant is domiciled, as explained above, or where 
performance of the contract is due.130 Courts have emphasized 
jurisdiction is proper in the forum where performance actually took 

124. Id. 
125. NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] arts. 42-48 (Fr.), available in 
English at Code of Civil Procedure, Legifrance.gouv.fr, 4-5 (Sept. 30, 2005), 
http://195.83.177.9/upl/pdf/code_ 39.pdf.; see CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 14-15 (Fr.), 
translated in The French Civil Code 4 (John H. Crabb rev. ed., trans., 1995) http://
ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_resid_jurisd_france_en.pdf (delineating personal 
jurisdiction under French law); see also Masahisa Deguchi & Marcel Storme, THE RECEPTION 
AND TRANSMISSION OF CIVIL PROCEDURAL LAW IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY: LEGISLATIVE 
AND LEGAL EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN PROCEDURAL LAW 262-67 




20of%20civil%20procedure%20france&f=false (detailing the origins of French civil 
procedural law and the adoption of the New Code). 
126. NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 42 (Fr.) (providing that 
defendant’s domicile in France makes jurisdiction in a French court proper over any claim). 
127. See id. at art. 102; see also Cass. Civ. 2ème, Jan. 23, 1958, JCP G 1958, IV, 30 
(explaining domicile for corporations at its registered, or statutory, seat). 
128. See Cass. Civ. 1ère, Jan. 31, 1968, Bull. civ. I, no. 41 (describing how jurisdiction 
may be proper even if defendant is not actually domiciled). 
129. NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 46 (Fr.).  
130. Pierre Raoul-Duval & Marie Stoyanov Gide Loyrette Nouel, Comparative Study Of 
“Residual Jurisdiction” In Civil And Commercial Disputes In The EU National Report For: 
France, at 7, available at http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_resid_jurisd_france
_en.pdf (explaining proper bases for jurisdiction in contract cases) (citing Cass. Civ. 2ème, 
Jan. 18, 2001, Bull. civ., II, no. 10).  
2014] NOT AT HOME 1839 
place or was intended to take place, not simply where the parties 
contracted.131 
Jurisdiction for tort claims is also outlined in Article Forty-
Six.132 A plaintiff may bring a tort claim in one of three places: where 
the defendant is domiciled, where the tort occurred, or where the 
damage was suffered.133 In situations where the damage is suffered in 
several states, French courts may opt to split the proceedings 
accordingly.134 Specific jurisdiction can also be asserted over a 
corporation’s local branch when two conditions are met.135 First, the 
branch must be truly autonomous.136 Secondly, the dispute must arise 
from the operations of that specific branch.137  
Articles Fourteen and Fifteen of the Civil Code are the 
“privileged” rules of jurisdiction, since they only apply to French 
nationals.138 Article Fourteen provides, “[a]n alien, even if not 
residing in France, may be cited before French courts for the 
performance of obligations contracted by him in France with a French 
person; he may be called before the courts of France for obligations 
contracted by him in a foreign country towards French persons.”139 
While this basis for jurisdiction may not be used against other EU 
defendants, by virtue of the EU Regulation, it may still be asserted 

131. Duval & Nouel, supra note 130, at 7 (noting that courts often take practical 
considerations into account). 
132. NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 46 (Fr.) (defining when tort 
jurisdiction is proper).  
133. See id. (outlining the three sources for tort jurisdiction).  
134. Duval & Nouel, supra note 130, at 8-9 (citing Court of Appeal, June 30, 1984, 
HRM Duchess of Windsor v. Sanchez Gomez, Rev. crit. DIP 1985) (noting that courts prefer 
to split these claims then resolve them together). 
135. Id. (citing Cass. Civ. 1ère, June 18, 1958, Rev. crit. DIP, 1958, 754) (explaining 
requirement for specific jurisdiction). 
136. Id. (citing Nancy Court of Appeal, Dec. 2, 2002, JCP G, 2004, IV, p. 1808) (noting 
that branch must able to enter into independent agreements). 
137. Id. (citing Cass. Civ. 1ère, Nov. 15, 1983, pourvoi no. 82-12.626). 
138. NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 14 (Fr.); Duval & Nouel, 
supra note 130, at 17 (explaining the operation of Articles 14-15).  
139. NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 14 (Fr.). See generally 
Clermont & Palmer, supra note 20 (discussing the historical basis of Article 14 basis and its 
current application in French courts). 
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against US defendants.140 Article Fifteen likewise provides 
jurisdiction when the defendant is a French national.141 
4. Personal Jurisdiction in the United Kingdom    
The United Kingdom follows the common law approach, where 
legal rules are largely developed through case law.142 Following the 
adoption of the EU Regulation, the United Kingdom passed the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (the “1982 Act”), which 
incorporated much of the EU law, and applies to England, Scotland, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland.143 For jurisdictional rules, specifically, 
they are codified in the Civil Procedure Rules (the “CPR”). 144 
Just like the European Union, domicile provides a basis for 
general jurisdiction in the United Kingdom.145 General jurisdiction is 
also proper in UK courts when a defendant, even an alien, is served 
process in the United Kingdom.146 Because this “tag” jurisdiction is 
prohibited under the EU Regulation, it may only be asserted against 
non-EU defendants.147  

140. See EU Regulation art. 4 (permitting EU member states to craft their own 
jurisdictional rules in cases not involving EU defendants); see also Born, supra note 45, at 14 
(surveying the jurisdictional rules of other nations). 
141. NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 15 (Fr.) (providing 
jurisdiction when the defendant is a French national). 
142. Brian Pearce, Note, The Comity Doctrine as a Barrier to Judicial Jurisdiction: A 
US-E.U. Comparison, 30 STAN. J. INT’L L. 525, 536 (citing STEPHEN O'MALLEY & 
ALEXANDER LAYTON, EUROPEAN CIVIL PRACTICE 9-10 (1989)) (“Although the Supreme 
Court [of Judicature of England and Wales] is of statutory origin, having been established by 
the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, its jurisdiction has never been comprehensively 
defined by statute.”); see also Chris Woodruff & Karen Reed, Comparative Study Of 
“Residual Jurisdiction” In Civil And Commercial Disputes In The EU National Report For: 
England, at 2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_resid_jurisd_
england_en.pdf (providing extensive detail into the background of civil procedure in England). 
143. Woodruff & Reed, supra note 142, at 2 (explaining the basis for jurisdiction in 
England); Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act of 1982 (codifying the rules of jurisdiction). 
144. Woodruff & Reed, supra note 142, at 2 (describing the codification of the civil 
procedure rules). See generally Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”). 
145. CPR Part 6(B) para 3.1 (permitting jurisdiction over any claim when the defendant 
is domiciled in the UK). 
146. H.R.H Maharanee Seethadevi Gaekwar of Baroda v. Wildenstein [1972] 2 W.L.R 
1077 (describing so-called “tag” jurisdiction); see also Colt Industries Inc v Sarlie.  
147.See Linda J. Silberman, Judicial Jurisdiction in the Conflict of Laws Course, 28 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 405 (1995) (noting tag jurisdiction is prohibited against EU 
defendants); id. (citing The Official Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, EC 22 O.J. C 59/1, at C 59/19-
20) (also prohibiting the use German ZPO Twenty-Three and Article 14 against other EU 
domiciliaries).   
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For jurisdiction over a defendant served outside of the United 
Kingdom, the claimant must provide a proper basis for the suit under 
the CPR.148 For contract claims against non-UK defendants, 
jurisdiction is proper when the contract was made in the United 
Kingdom, was made through an agent in the United Kingdom, is 
governed by UK law or a UK court is stipulated, or when the 
contractual breach occurs in the United Kingdom.149 For tort claims, 
jurisdiction is proper when damage was suffered within the United 
Kingdom or the act occurred in the United Kingdom.150 Additionally, 
the CPR provides that when a plaintiff is seeking an injunction 
against a defendant whose conduct is taking place in the United 
Kingdom, jurisdiction is proper.151 Jurisdiction is also proper when 
the defendant is a required party to a claim already served on a 
defendant in the United Kingdom.152  
Finally, UK courts permit a form of “doing business” 
jurisdiction, codified in both the Companies Act of 2006 and the 
CPR.153 Under the Companies Act, service is proper on an “overseas 
company”—registered in the United Kingdom, if it is left, or sent by 
mail, to “any place of business of the company.”154 The CPR adds a 
little clarity, providing that jurisdiction over a non-UK company is 
proper when it is served at “any place within the jurisdiction where 
the corporation carries on its activities or any place of business of the 
company within the jurisdiction.”155 Though courts generally have 
agreed a sufficient connection to the UK forum is required, precisely 
what is required is unclear.156  

148. CPR Part 6(B) (applies when service occurs outside of the jurisdiction). 
149. CPR Part 6(B) para. 3.6(b) (noting that jurisdiction is also proper when the contract 
is made by an agent living in the United Kingdom). 
150. CPR Part 6(B) para. 3.9(a)-(b) (providing basis for tort jurisdiction). 
151. CPR Part 6(B) para. 3.2 (explaining when jurisdiction is proper over a claim for 
injunction). 
152. CPR Part 6(B) para. 3.4 (delineating when jurisdiction is proper over required 
parties). 
153. Companies Act 2006, § 1139(2)(b); CPR Part 6.9 (allowing service on a corporate 
defendant).  
154. Companies Act 2006, § 1139(2)(b). 
155. CPR Part 6.9 (allowing service on a corporate defendant). 
156. See, e.g., South India Shipping Corp. v. Export-Import Bank of Korea [1985] 1 
W.L.R. 585 (allowing service on an office where only incidental activities were carried out 
under an earlier version of the Company Act). But see Rakusens Ltd v. Baser Ambalaj Plastik 
Sanayi Ticaret AS, [2001] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1820 (Court of Appeal) (holding that agent of the 
company is not enough). 
1842 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1821 
In fact, the Civil Division of the Royal Courts of Justice has 
addressed the dueling authorities on proper jurisdiction over non-
English companies.157 In Lakah Group v. Al Jazeera Satellite Chanel, 
the appeals court set out to determine whether the corporate defendant 
had been properly served under either the CPR or the Companies 
Act.158 Noting that the lower court determined the Companies Act 
presented a higher standard than the CPR, the court found that the 
determination ultimately did not matter because the CPR—the lower 
standard—had not even been met.159 In affirming the lower court’s 
judgment that service was not proper, the appeals court agreed that a 
corporation’s “transient or irregular connection” to the forum would 
not suffice.160  
II. A COMPARISON OF APPROACHES 
 Part II of this Note will compare personal jurisdiction doctrine 
in the United States to personal jurisdiction in the European Union, 
focusing on Germany, France, and England. Part II.A will focus on 
the differences in the sources of personal jurisdiction rules, and the 
rationale underlying their creation. Part II.B will discuss the 
differences in general jurisdiction. Part II.C explores how specific 
jurisdiction cases are handled differently in the United States and the 
European Union. Finally, Part II.D will discuss the role 
reasonableness plays in US courts and EU courts. As will be 
demonstrated below, the US minimum contacts approach is more 
restrictive than the European statutory approach.  
 A. Source and Rationale  
 The differences between personal jurisdiction in the United 
States and the European Union largely are accounted for by 
fundamental differences in the source of the rules and the reasons 
behind them.161 In the European Union, jurisdictional rules often are 

157. Lakah Group v. Al Jazeera Satellite Chanel, [2003] E.W.C.A. (civ.) 1781 
(acknowledging the Companies Act and the CPR both contain jurisdictional rules governing 
overseas companies).  
158. See id.  
159. See id. 
160. See id. 
161. See von Dryander, supra note 89, at 673 (jurisdiction is a product of statutory 
interpretation, not constitutionality); see, e.g., Silberman, Observations, supra note 20, at 607-
09 (noting the differences in rationale between the US and the EU).  
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geared toward providing a forum for EU plaintiffs to obtain relief.162 
In France, Article Fourteen clearly does this.163 Germany’s Section 
Twenty-Three does not.164 Section Twenty-Three specifically was 
enacted to ensure German creditors, not just any German plaintiff, 
had a forum to obtain relief against non-German debtors.165 
As for the source of jurisdictional rules in the European Union, 
these rules are codified by national legislatures in official civil code, 
like the New Code of Civil Procedure in France, and Germany’s 
ZPO.166 These rules provide clarity for plaintiffs trying to decide 
where to bring a suit, and notice to defendants as to where they may 
be sued.167 The court’s role is simple: determine whether or not a 
statutory basis for jurisdiction applies.168  
On the other hand, US personal jurisdiction doctrine is derived 
from the Constitution—to be more specific, the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.169 To satisfy due process, the 
relationship between the defendant and the forum must be sufficiently 

162. See Silberman, Observations, supra note 20, at 607 (noting French Article 14 does 
this explicitly); Luxembourg Civil Code art. 14 (permitting jurisdiction based on nationality of 
the plaintiff); Dutch Code of Civil Procedure art. 126(3) (same). 
163. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 14 (Fr.) (“French National . . . .”); see also Clermont 
& Palmer, supra note 20, at 3 (noting that French article merely does it on the basis of 
“Frenchness”). 
164. See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Dec. 5, 2005, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBI.] 3202, as amended, § 23 (general jurisdiction attaches when 
defendant has property in Germany).  
165. Kuner, supra note 89, at 696 (explaining purpose of section Twenty-Three 
jurisdiction); von Dryander, supra note 89, at 680 (same). 
166. See Silberman, Observations, supra note 20, at 609-10 (discussing the clarity of EU 
rules given their statutory nature, and the lack of “residual” constitutional constraints”). See 
generally EU Regulation; ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], 
(Ger.); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] (Fr.); CPR (England). 
167. See Silberman, Observations, supra note 20, at 609-10 (discussing the clarity of EU 
rules given their statutory nature, and the lack of “residual” constitutional constraints”). See 
generally EU Regulation; ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], 
(Ger.); NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] (Fr.); CPR (England). 
168. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 14 (Fr.) (court determines whether the plaintiff is 
French); see also Silberman, Observations, supra note 20, at 609-10 (describing the ease of 
this process). 
169. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue process 
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not 
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.’”). 
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strong.170 In contrast to the European Union, the focus is on fairness 
to defendants, not providing plaintiffs access to local courts.171  
Under the US system, courts are required to make a factual 
determination each and every time in determining whether 
jurisdiction comports with due process.172 Courts must review the 
scope of a defendant’s activities in the forum, and decide if they have 
the necessary minimum contacts.173 Even if the contacts are sufficient, 
a defendant may then argue that the assertion of jurisdiction is 
nonetheless unreasonable, providing them with yet another 
safeguard.174  
Calling the minimum contacts approach “amorphous” and 
“imprecise,” scholars have recognized its negative impact on 
jurisdictional certainty.175 At the very least, the approach stands in 
stark contrast to the EU approach, where codified rules allow courts 
to quickly determine whether jurisdiction is proper.176 Outside of the 
judicial process, the EU Rules streamline the process for both 
plaintiffs and defendants.177 

170. See id. at 320 (measuring the strength of defendant’s contacts to the forum state); 
Walden v. Fiore 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014) (reiterating the importance of the defendant’s 
affiliation with the forum state); Silberman, Observations, supra note 20, at 607 (noting this 
difference).  
171. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (noting defendant focus).  
172. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (finding that jurisdiction must comport with “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice”).   
173. Id.; see also Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (“The Due 
Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding 
judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful “contacts, ties, or 
relations.”); Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting the difficulty in this 
approach) 
174. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 115-16 
(1987) (explaining how the factors are to be considered). 
175. Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World, supra note 11, at 1722; A. 
Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for Our Federal Courts, 87 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 325, 328 (2010). 
176. See, e.g., NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 46 (Fr.); 
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], §§ 12-34 (Ger.). But see 
Silberman, Judicial Jurisdiction, supra note 147, at 397-98 (noting discretion occasionally 
plays a role in English Courts). 
177. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 14 (Fr.) (court determines whether the plaintiff is 
French); see also Silberman, Observations, supra note 20, at 609-10 (describing the ease of 
this process). 
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B. General Jurisdiction   
General jurisdiction operates, for the most part, the same way in 
the United States as it does in the European Union.178 Domicile is the 
accepted basis for such jurisdiction.179 When a defendant is domiciled 
in the forum state, jurisdiction is proper over any type of claim.180  
Given the freedom to craft their own jurisdictional rules when it 
comes to non-EU defendants, Member States have embraced sources 
of general jurisdiction beyond domicile.181 Examples of this can be 
found in German Section Twenty-Three, French Article Fourteen, and 
English “doing-business” jurisdiction.182 Since each one is classified 
as exorbitant under the EU Regulation, they may not be asserted 
against EU defendants.183 Where non-EU defendants are concerned, 
however, these bases of jurisdiction make it easier for German, 
French, and English nationals to sue at home.184 The impact of this 
becomes apparent after revisiting Goodyear with the European rules 
in mind.  
In Goodyear, the US Supreme Court dismissed the wrongful 
death claims of the US plaintiffs, holding personal jurisdiction over 
the non-US defendants was improper because they were not at home 
in the forum state.185 What if the case concerned German plaintiffs 
and non-EU defendants, such as Goodyear USA (so that Section 
Twenty-Three would apply)?186 So long as the defendant had property 

178. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (holding that domicile is 
required for general jurisdiction); EU Regulation at art. 2(1) (same). 
179. See, e.g., Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (holding that domicile is required for general 
jurisdiction); EU Regulation at art. 2(1) (same). 
180. Compare Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (explaining domicile provides jurisdiction over 
any type of claim), with EU Regulation at art. 2(1) (same). 
181. See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 14 (Fr.) (jurisdiction based on nationality); 
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 23 (Ger.) (jurisdiction based 
on property in Germany).  
182. See Code Civil [C. CIV.] art. 14 (Fr.); ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 23 (Ger.).  
183. See EU Regulation Annex 1 (bases of jurisdiction not permitted against other EU 
domiciliaries); EU Regulation art. 4(1) (noting these bases for jurisdiction may be asserted 
against non-EU defendants). 
184. See EU Regulation art. 4(2) (Member States own jurisdictional rules apply when 
defendants are non-EU); see, e.g., Clermont & Palmer, supra note 20, at 17 (“Each country’s 
exorbitant jurisdiction constitutes a way to allow its own people to sue at home when they can 
recover at home, which is usually so much easier than suing abroad.”). 
185. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (dismissing the claims). 
186. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 23 (Ger.) 
(jurisdiction proper when defendant owns property in Germany).  
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in Germany, for example, an office worth US$150,000, personal 
jurisdiction would be proper.187 The same would satisfy a court of 
England under “doing business” jurisdiction.188 In France, the office 
could burn down and jurisdiction still would be proper.189 A French 
plaintiff is all that is required.190  
Article Fourteen goes even further than that, occasionally 
permitting general jurisdiction based solely on the domicile of the 
plaintiff, a practice explicitly endorsed by several other Member 
States.191 In Guggenheim v. Helion, the French trial court combined 
EU Regulation Article 4(2) with French Article Fourteen to reach this 
very result.192 Since Article 4(2) grants EU-domiciled plaintiffs access 
to the jurisdictional rules of their forum State, US plaintiffs residing 
in France successfully asserted Article Fourteen jurisdiction over a 
non-EU defendant.193 Keeping this proposition in mind, a French 
court would find jurisdiction proper in Goodyear, regardless of 
nationality, so long as the plaintiffs lived in France.194 In the United 
States, jurisdiction is not proper solely based on nationality of the 
plaintiff, much less their domicile.195 

187. See id.  
188. See CPR Part 6.9 (requiring any fixed place of business). But see Companies Act of 
1985 (U.K.) (requiring place of business and sufficient connection).  
189. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 14 (Fr.) (requiring French plaintiff); see also Luxembourg 
Civil Code art. 14 (same); [Rv] CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, art. 126(3) (Neth.) (same). 
190. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 14 (Fr.) (requiring French plaintiff).  
191. See [Rv] CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, art. 126(3) (Neth.) (permitting jurisdiction 
based on plaintiff’s domicile); Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World, supra note 
11, at 1746 (citing EU Regulation) (noting countries outside of the United States allow 
jurisdiction based on domicile of the plaintiff); Fond. Solomon R. Guggenheim v. Helion, 
Cass. Civ. 1e, July 3, 1996, 124 Journal Du Droit International 1016 (1997) (holding 
jurisdiction on basis of plaintiff’s domicile was proper). 
192. Fond. Solomon R. Guggenheim v. Helion, Cass. Civ. 1e, July 3, 1996, 124 Journal 
Du Droit International 1016 (1997) (finding Article 14 jurisdiction properly asserted over non-
EU defendant by French resident); see, e.g., Clermont & Palmer, supra note 20, at 13 
(“Another effect of the Brussels Regulation is to extend the remaining privilege of suing in 
French courts based on Article 14 jurisdiction to all domiciliaries of France, not just French 
nationals.”). 
193. Id. (applying the EU Regulation in conjunction with Article 14).  
194. See id.  
195. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (holding that domicile 
is required for general jurisdiction). But see Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World, 
supra note 11, at 1726 (noting courts allowed US plaintiffs to use general jurisdiction in the 
past in order to sue at home). 
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 C. Specific Jurisdiction  
Rules for specific jurisdiction—those granting jurisdiction over 
certain causes of action—can be found in both the United States and 
the European Union.196 Within their national rules for civil procedure, 
Germany, France, and England also provide for specific 
jurisdiction.197 In those countries, certain events trigger jurisdiction by 
statute.198 Under the US minimum contacts approach, however, there 
is no triggering event for specific jurisdiction.199  
Section C is divided into two subsections, each discussing a 
unique feature of US specific jurisdiction analysis. The first will 
discuss the role discretion plays in determining whether contacts are 
sufficient to justify personal jurisdiction. The second will discuss the 
unique requirement of purposeful availment. 
 1. US Courts Retain Discretion  
As explained above, in the European Union, specific jurisdiction 
is statutorily granted.200 Codified rules dictate when certain types of 
claims may be brought within the forum.201 In the United States, the 
assertion of specific personal jurisdiction must still satisfy the 
constitutional standard of due process through a showing of minimum 
contacts.202 As set forth by the Supreme Court in International Shoe, 
specific jurisdiction exists when the cause of action arises from the 
defendant’s in-state contacts.203  
As Nicastro makes evident, specific jurisdiction may not be easy 
to establish, even for plaintiffs domiciled in the United States.204 

 
197. NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 46 (Fr.) (describing proper 
basis for tort jurisdiction). 
198. Id. (describing proper basis for tort jurisdiction). 
199. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (examining 
factors which may be relevant to the assertion of personal jurisdiction).  
200. See NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 46 (Fr.) (describing 
proper basis for tort jurisdiction); see, e.g., EU Regulation art. 5(3) (harm and effects). 
201. See NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 46 (Fr.) (describing 
proper basis for tort jurisdiction); see, e.g., EU Regulation art. 5(3) (harm and effects). 
202. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945) (explaining what 
due process requires). 
203. See id. at 317 (describing specific jurisdiction).  
204. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (holding personal jurisdiction over UK defendant 
was improper); Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World, supra note 11, at 1729 
(explaining the negative effects Nicastro has had on personal jurisdiction analysis from a 
plaintiff’s perspective). 
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Using its discretion in deciding the jurisdictional question, the Court 
in Nicastro held personal jurisdiction over the UK defendant was not 
proper absent a showing of specific intent.205 The Court considered 
other factors in the record as well, including the fact that other 
machines were sold across the United States, a few even in New 
Jersey, but nonetheless found intent dispositive.206 The outcome was 
considered by commentators to be unfair, wrongly decided, and to 
one scholar to be “viscerally upsetting.”207 
Sometimes, however, the Court’s multi-step review of the record 
comes out the other way, demonstrating the unpredictability inherent 
in the minimum contacts approach.208 For example, in Burger King v. 
Rudzewicz, where two franchise owners of a Burger King in Michigan 
defaulted on payments, the Court found specific jurisdiction proper in 
Florida because Florida law governed their franchise agreement.209 
The Court further explained that the franchise owners’ continuing 
relationship with the brand’s Miami headquarters over a twenty-year 
period reinforced their “deliberate affiliation” with the forum.210 
 As demonstrated above, the European Union does not concern 
itself with the strength of an “affiliation” to the forum.211 The bases 
for specific jurisdiction are explicitly set out in the European rules 
with respect to any type of claim, and a court must simply determine 
if one applies.212 To illustrate the effect of this difference, it is helpful 
to revisit a US case with European jurisdictional rules in mind.213 

205. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (requiring plaintiff to show defendant intended its 
products enter the New Jersey market specifically).  
206. See id.  
207. See Drobak, Personal Jurisdition in a Global World, supra note 11, at 1729 (“The 
finding of a lack of personal jurisdiction in Nicastro is the worst result in any personal 
jurisdiction case . . . .”); Paul D. Carrington, Business Interests and the Long Arm in 2011, 63 
S.C. L. REV. 637, 638-41 (2012) (calling it wrongly decided); John Vail, Six Questions in 
Light of Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 517, 517  (2012) (calling the decision “viscerally 
upsetting”). 
208. See, e.g., Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985) (holding specific 
jurisdiction proper).  
209. Id. at 482 (noting that their franchise agreement outlined this).  
210. See id.  
211. See, e.g., EU Regulation (laying out the bases for personal jurisdiction in EU 
courts).  
212. See EU Regulation art. 5 (explaining when specific jurisdiction is proper).  
213. See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 482 (1985) (personal jurisdiction proper in 
Florida where contractual performance was due in Florida). But see J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2784 (2011) (personal jurisdiction improper where defendant did 
not intend for its products to end up in New Jersey).  
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For example, had Burger King been adjudicated in a European 
court, the court would have come to the same conclusion, albeit in a 
one-step analysis.214 The court would merely look at the franchise 
agreement signed by the defendants, and easily determine that 
franchise payments were due to the franchise headquarters in 
Florida.215 That fact alone would satisfy the jurisdictional rules of 
Germany, France, and England, without any further findings.216  
 2. Purposeful Availment  
In specific jurisdiction cases, it is common for US courts to ask 
whether the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the forum 
state.217 This requirement is noticeably absent from the European 
rules for jurisdiction.218 To demonstrate this fact, pretend Nicastro 
occurred in France, and a French national was injured by an English 
product.219 Jurisdiction would have been proper since the tort 
occurred in France.220 Furthermore, had the tort occurred outside of 
France, and the defendant was not an EU domiciliary, Article 
Fourteen would have provided the French plaintiff access to French 
courts.221   
 Purposeful availment particularly impacts specific jurisdiction 
cases that are based on products liability claims, given the sometimes-
broad application of the stream of commerce theory.222 To illustrate 
this point, revisiting World-Wide Volkswagen is instructive, where the 

214. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], § 29 (Ger.); NOUVEAU 
CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 46 (Fr.); CPR Part 6(B) para. 3.6(b) (England). 
215. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 482 (explaining factual background).  
216. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 29 (Ger.) 
(jurisdiction proper where performance of contract is due); NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE 
CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 46 (Fr.) (same); CPR part 6(20) (same). 
217. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2784 (2011) (finding this 
point dispositive to plaintiff’s claims).  
218. Wendy Perdue, Purposeful Availment, 98 NW. U. L. REV. at 461-62 (describing this 
practice); see also Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World, supra note 11, at 1731 
n.108 (noting this does not displace the minimum contacts test).  
219. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2795 (explaining how the defendant was injured).  
220. NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 46 (Fr.) (jurisdiction proper 
where tort occurred); see also ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], 
§ 32 (Ger.) (same); CPR Part 6(B) 3.9(a)-(b) (same).  
221. French Article 14 (jurisdiction proper when plaintiff is a French national); Clermont 
& Palmer, supra note 20, at 14 (noting one reason for such jurisdiction is to provide French 
citizens access to French courts).  
222. See Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World, supra note 11, at 1730-32 
(explaining this); Perdue, supra note 218, at 462 (same). 
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plaintiffs filed a products liability action against defendants for 
injuries sustained in an automobile accident in Oklahoma.223 The 
Supreme Court accepted the alien defendants’ argument that its 
product, an Audi, ended up in Oklahoma through the plaintiff’s 
actions alone.224 Finding the defendants never purposefully availed 
themselves of the “privileges and benefits” of Oklahoma law, the 
Court held the assertion of personal jurisdiction was improper.225  
In the European Union, as explained above, specific jurisdiction 
does not consider purposeful availment.226 Specific jurisdiction is 
permitted where statute provides, without requiring courts to measure 
contacts.227 If the accident in World-Wide Volkswagen occurred in 
Germany, France, or England, jurisdiction would have been proper, 
on the basis that the tort, more specifically the harm, occurred within 
the forum.228  
D. Reasonableness  
Though it is now clear that reasonableness only plays a role in 
specific jurisdiction cases in the United States, there is debate among 
scholars about the role reasonableness plays in jurisdictional analysis 
outside of the United States.229 Again, focusing on Germany, France, 
and England, it is clear that reasonableness, insofar as it balances 
various interests, is not considered in determining whether personal 

223. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980) (describing 
the background of the action). 
224. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299 (holding personal jurisdiction over 
defendant improper).  
225. See id. at 295, 299.  
226. NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 46 (Fr.) (jurisdiction proper 
where tort occurred); see also ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], 
§ 32 (Ger.)(same); CPR 6(20) (same). 
227. NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 46 (Fr.) (jurisdiction proper 
where tort occurred); see also ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], 
§ 32 (Ger.) (same); CPR 6(20) (same). 
228. NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 46 (Fr.) (jurisdiction proper 
where tort occurred); see also ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], 
§ 32 (Ger.) (same); CPR 6(20) (same).  
229. See Silberman, supra note 11, at 130 (arguing reasonableness is not a factor); Born, 
supra note 45, at 19 (noting that a reasonableness analysis is a growing trend in transnational 
litigation). 
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jurisdiction is proper.230 The closest any of these countries come is the 
limitation placed on Section Twenty-Three of the ZPO.231  
While requiring a “sufficient connection” to Germany does not 
require any balancing of interests, as in the United States, the BGH 
acknowledged that the requirement was necessary to avoid creating 
“friction” with other countries.232 This was a concern noted by the 
Court in Asahi, and other cases since.233 Following Daimler, 
reasonableness analysis in the United States is now limited to specific 
jurisdiction cases, a non-exorbitant basis for jurisdiction.234 In 
Germany, the “sufficient connection” requirement is reserved for the 
exorbitant Section Twenty-Three jurisdiction.235 
As demonstrated in Part II, the US minimum contacts approach 
to personal jurisdiction is fundamentally more pro-defendant, and 
thus restrictive for plaintiffs than the European approach.236 Germany, 
France, and England each allow bases of general jurisdiction beyond 
domicile, the US plaintiff’s only option following Daimler.237 With 
respect to specific jurisdiction, the US minimum contacts approach is 
not only more restrictive, with its requirement of purposeful 
availment, but the reliance on judicial discretion stands in stark 
contrast to the statutory approach embraced in Europe.238    
III. A NEW APPROACH TO US PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Defendant-oriented, the US minimum contacts approach to 
personal jurisdiction is more restrictive than the approach taken by the 
European Union, Germany, France, or England.239 This places US 

230. See supra  Part I.B (discussing personal jurisdiction rules in the European Union).  
231. Judgment of July 2, 1991, BGH, 1991 NJW 3092 (requiring a sufficient connection 
to Germany).  
232. Id. 
233. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 114 
(1987) (using reasonableness analysis in the international context to avoid creating friction 
with other nations); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 (2014) (noting other nations’ 
retaliatory jurisdictional rules).    
234. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20 (asserting that reasonableness is not appropriate 
in general jurisdiction cases). 
235. Judgment of July 2, 1991, BGH, 1991 NJW 3092; see also Silberman, supra note 
11, at 131 (noting reasonableness analysis is more appropriate in general jurisdiction cases).  
236. See supra Part II (demonstrating that under EU jurisdictional rules US cases would 
have come out in favor of EU plaintiffs). 
237. See supra Part II.B (comparing general jurisdiction in the U.S. and the Eurpoean 
Union).  
238. See supra Part II.C (describing differences in specific jurisdiction).  
239. See supra notes 186-94  (demonstrating how the US approach is more restrictive).  
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plaintiffs at a disadvantage in obtaining relief as compared to their EU 
counterparts, who have access to codified rules, which are applied 
predictably and consistently.240 Following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, US plaintiffs are worse off now 
than ever before.241  
Part III.A will address the far-reaching and negative impact the 
Court’s decision in Daimler will have on the ability of US plaintiffs to 
sue at home. Part III.B will argue for a new approach to personal 
jurisdiction, one that incorporates international law norms, called “the 
national contacts approach.” Part III.C will discuss the positive 
impact the proposed national contacts approach will have on personal 
jurisdiction in the United States.  
A. Daimler: A Step Too Far 
Now, more than ever, US plaintiffs lack the jurisdictional means 
to hale alien defendants into US courts.242 Prior to Goodyear and 
Daimler, courts were asserting general personal jurisdiction over 
defendants who had systematic and continuous contacts with the 
forum state—commonly known as US “doing business” 
jurisdiction.243 In Goodyear, the Court explained that general 
jurisdiction is proper only when a defendant is “at home” in the 
forum.244 With lower courts still unsure about the proper scope of 
general jurisdiction, the Court tried once again in Daimler AG v. 
Bauman.245 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, looked to jurisdictional 
rules of the European Union and asserted that “at home” meant the 
defendant was domiciled in the forum state.246 Justice Ginsburg’s 
analysis continued by attacking Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, 

240. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (outlining the codified rules in the 
European Union).  
241. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (explaining that without courts’ 
uneven application of general jurisdiction plaintiffs will be forced to take these claims abroad 
losing benefits of US legal system). 
242. See supra note 60-61 and accompanying text (explaining general jurisdiction only 
proper where defendant is domiciled in the forum state).   
243. See supra note 53 (explaining how some courts applied loose standard for general 
jurisdiction).  
244. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (delineating the at home standard). 
245. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (attempting to clarify the unclear 
standard). 
246. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (holding domicile required for general 
jurisdiction). 
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which would have dismissed the case on reasonableness grounds 
alone.247 She asserted that reasonableness is not a proper 
consideration in general jurisdiction cases.248  
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Daimler will have serious 
consequences for US plaintiffs.249 As explained above, general 
jurisdiction occasionally served as a jurisdictional basis of last 
resort.250 When US plaintiffs could not make showings sufficient for 
specific jurisdiction, especially in cases against non-US corporations, 
courts allowed plaintiffs to make a showing of the defendant’s 
“continuous and systematic” business activities in the forum state.251 
Reasonableness then acted as a safety valve for the defendants.252 If 
jurisdiction was truly unreasonable, courts could decline it on that 
basis alone, just as Justice Sotomayor urged the Court to do in 
Daimler.253  
General jurisdiction, the sole door to relief for US plaintiffs 
when the minimum contacts approach was otherwise too narrow, is 
now officially closed.254 Losing the benefits of the US judicial 
system, with its contingency fees and jury trials, US plaintiffs will be 
forced to litigate such claims abroad.255 This is in stark contrast to 
similarly situated EU plaintiffs, who often have no trouble finding a 
forum for redress at home.256  
B. The National Contacts Test  
In light of Daimler and the prevailing international rules for 
personal jurisdiction, it is time for the United States to reconsider 

247. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (cautioning that the Court’s decision will 
have unforeseen impact). 
248. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (explaining when reasonableness is 
appropriate). 
249. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (closing the door on general jurisdiction). 
250. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (explaining how general jurisdiction was 
used when plaintiffs could not make the requisite showing of contacts for specific jurisdiction). 
251. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (demonstrating that systematic and 
continuous activities was essentially used as a test for general jurisdiction). 
252. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing the role reasonableness 
played). 
253. See supra Part I.A.4 (deciding the case on reasonableness alone). 
254. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (holding domicile required for general 
jurisdiction). 
255. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing benefits of US legal system). 
256. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining jurisdictional rules in Europe 
which allow plaintiffs to sue at home).  
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personal jurisdiction.257 Free from the constitutional underlay 
embodied in the minimum contacts approach, “the proposed national 
contacts test” shifts the focus away from the defendant, focusing 
instead on providing forums for US plaintiffs to obtain relief.258 Based 
in part on the Asahi factors and in part on internationally accepted 
principles of jurisdiction, the national contacts approach provides 
predictability on one hand and the discretionary ability to limit 
exorbitant assertions of jurisdiction on the other.259   
The first prong of the national contacts approach asks the court 
to address the “accepted” bases of jurisdiction.260 The Supreme Court 
has already shown a willingness to align itself with international 
jurisdictional norms in adopting domicile as a basis for general 
jurisdiction.261 As it currently stands, US-style specific jurisdiction 
remains an outlier in the international field, especially with regards to 
purposeful availment.262 Following the predictable and 
straightforward EU rules, tort jurisdiction is proper under the national 
contacts approach when the act occurs in the forum, or if its effects 
are felt in that forum.263 For a contract claim, the court determines if 
the breach occurred in the forum or whether the contract was made in 
the forum.264  
This approach seeks to resolve the unfairness felt by US 
plaintiffs as demonstrated in cases like Nicastro.265 Through the 
national contacts approach, a US citizen injured on US soil will 
always have a forum for relief, no matter who, or what, the defendant 
is.266 The fact the injury occurred in the United States would be 

257. See supra Part I.B (outlining jurisdictional rules of other nations).   
258. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the European rationale behind 
personal jurisdiction). 
259. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing Asahi reasonableness). 
260. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (discussing accepted bases of 
jurisdiction in the European Union).   
261. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (adopting paradigmatic examples of 
domicile in the European Union). 
262. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing unique features of US specific jurisdiction). 
263. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing tort jurisdiction in the 
European Union). 
264. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (describing contract jurisdiction in the 
European Union). 
265. See supra note 220 (demonstrating unfairness in Nicastro). 
266. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing the place of harm as always 
sufficient for jurisdiction). 
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enough to establish proper jurisdiction, without concern for minimum 
contacts or purposeful availment.267  
 When the first prong of the national contacts approach does 
not apply, that is when there is no accepted basis for jurisdiction, 
courts will move to the second prong of the national contacts 
approach, which incorporates Asahi reasonableness and the balancing 
of interests.268 The court would first determine what the US interests 
are in adjudicating the dispute.269 This could be a state’s interesting in 
regulating motor vehicles.270 There may even be some instances 
where enforcing human rights abroad is a salient US interest.271 Yet, 
as the name suggests, the national contacts approach gives 
considerable weight when the plaintiff is a US national, an approach 
taken by other countries.272  
While this resembles French Article Fourteen jurisdiction in that 
US nationals are given preference by virtue of their “American-ness,” 
there is a critical difference: a built-in safety valve to limit the effects 
of exorbitant jurisdiction.273 To borrow from Justice O’Connor in 
Asahi, courts next will consider the “interests of other nations” to 
make sure adjudication in a US court does not cause tension with 
other nations.274 This is where the court’s discretion comes into play, 
a traditional feature of the US judiciary 275  
When US interests are high, which will always be the case with 
a US plaintiff, and interests of other nations are low, jurisdiction is 
proper.276 If something like Goodyear were to happen again, where 
US plaintiffs bring a claim in US court for a tort that occurred in a 
different country, the national contacts approach would permit 
personal jurisdiction.277  

267. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (describing tort jurisdiction in the 
European Union). 
268. See supra notes 50-52 (discussing Asahi reasonableness). 
269. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing US interests). 
270. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing US interests). 
271. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing federal interests). 
272. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing Section Twenty-Three 
jurisdiction). 
273. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (explaining how reasonableness 
operates as a safety valve for defendants). 
274. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (explaining the interests of other nations 
come into play when their nationals are hailed into US courts). 
275. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (describing the discretionary role of US 
courts). 
276. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (discussing Asahi reasonableness). 
277. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text (discussing Goodyear). 
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In a situation where US interests are low, for example in the case 
of an indemnity claim involving only alien parties, a court will 
decline jurisdiction without even considering the interests of other 
nations.278 Under the proposed national contacts approach, Asahi 
would be decided the same way.279 Without a US party, or a state 
regulatory interest, there is simply no reason for a US court to 
adjudicate the dispute.280 
Though scholars have debated about the applicability of a 
reasonableness analysis in courts outside of the United States, it is 
important to emphasize its role under the national contacts 
approach.281 It is purely used as a way to limit exorbitant jurisdiction 
when US interests are lacking a safety valve for defendants.282 Thus, 
while the national contacts approach embraces the spirit of Article 
Fourteen, for example, it does not adopt it entirely.283   
C. Impact of the National Contacts Approach 
If adopted, the national contacts approach will put US plaintiffs 
on equal footing with plaintiffs around the world.284 At the most 
fundamental level, the national contacts approach decouples 
jurisdictional analysis from constitutional due process.285 Courts will 
no longer be burdened by measuring a defendant’s contacts with the 
forum state.286 In the vast majority of cases, the courts will not use 
their discretion at all.287 Determining jurisdiction under the first prong 
of the national contacts approach is as simple as EU courts 

278. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s decision in 
Asahi was partly based on lack of US parties). 
279. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (declining jurisdiction over the 
defendant because it was unreasonable). 
280. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing the reasonableness 
factors in Asahi). 
281. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (debating the role reasonableness plays 
in jurisdictional analysis). 
282. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing the role reasonableness 
played). 
283. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing French Article 14). 
284. See supra Part III.B (discussing the national contacts approach). 
285. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (explaining the minimum contacts 
approach foundation in due process). 
286. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (describing the minimum contacts 
approach). 
287. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (explaining statutory foundation of 
jurisdictional rules in the European Union). 
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determining whether there is a statutory basis for jurisdiction.288 A 
judge is merely asked to determine the type of claim and where the 
harm or breach occurred.289 As for the second prong, the existence of 
a US plaintiff makes the assertion of jurisdiction an easy one since the 
US interests in adjudicating the dispute are quite high.290 Outside of 
that, US courts will retain a small amount of the discretion they once 
had to determine whether jurisdiction is nonetheless unreasonable.291 
CONCLUSION 
Embracing the concept of international harmonization, the 
United States Supreme Court limited the scope of general jurisdiction 
in Daimler AG v. Bauman. However, in doing so, the Court closed off 
one of the few remaining avenues for US plaintiffs to obtain relief in 
US courts. By asserting that reasonableness plays no role in general 
jurisdiction, and alien defendants are only “at home” where they are 
domiciled, the Court once again favored defendants to the detriment 
of US plaintiffs. 
One way to fix the unfairness to US plaintiffs is to create a new 
test for personal jurisdiction, one decoupled from Constitutional Due 
Process, focused instead on alignment with international law norms. 
The national contacts approach, detailed above, accomplishes these 
goals in a straightforward and predictable manner.  
For example, a US citizen, his Argentine wife, and their four 
children are kidnapped by pirates while sailing off the coast of 
Argentina. Secretly funding these pirates was the large, multi-national 
corporation, Mercedes, headquartered in Germany. The pirates kill 
everyone but the husband. May he bring his claims against Mercedes 
in the United States? The answer, under the national contacts 





288. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (noting EU courts typically lack 
discretion in jurisdictional decisions). 
289. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (noting EU courts typically lack 
discretion in jurisdictional decisions). 
290. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing what happens when 
federal interests are involved). 
291. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing what happens when 
federal interests are involved). 
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